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I 
The debate over national immigration policy is at fever 
pitch. Harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric dominated the discourse 
during the early Republican presidential primaries. Congres-
sional gridlock has led states and cities, many far from the bor-
der, to take matters into their own hands by enacting laws or 
adopting policies aimed at encouraging immigrants to leave the 
jurisdiction by penalizing those who would employ or rent to 
them.1 During the 2007 legislative sessions, 46 states enacted 244 
immigration-related measures, triple the previous year's num-
ber.2 The one predictable outcome of this activity has been litiga-
tion.3 
The immigration conflagration of today is hardly a new 
phenomenon in United States history. It mirrors, albeit with 
greater intensity and on a larger scale, the immigration brush-
fires of the 1980's, when Congress responded to mounting calls 
for action by passing the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986,4 which for the first time imposed civil and criminalliabil-
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ity on employers who knowingly hired immigrants who lacked 
legal authority to work. Well before Congress acted, states had 
begun to take matters into their own hands. In 1975, Texas 
passed a law providing that alien children not legally admitted 
into ~he United States were not entitled to a free public educa-
tion.' 
The Supreme Court struck down the Texas law on June 15, 
1982, ruling that a state offering a free public education to the 
children of citizens had to provide the same opportunity to the 
alien children of undocumented immigrants. Justice Brennan, 
writing for the 5 to 4 majority in Plyler v. Doe, 6 said that a statute 
that imposed "a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children 
not accountable for their disabling status" while failing to serve 
any "substantial'' countervailing state interest violated the 14th 
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. 7 
Justice Powell concurred. "I agree with the Court that ... 
children should not be left on the streets uneducated," the for-
mer chairman of the Richmond, Va. school board and former 
president of the Virginia State Board of Education wrote in his 
five-page opinion.s In what became the decision's best-known 
line, Powell added: "A legislative classification that threatens the 
creation of an underclass of future citizens and residents cannot 
be reconciled with one of the fundamental purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment."9 
At the United States Department of Justice, within hours of 
the decision's announcement, two young special assistants in the 
office of the attorney general delivered a highly negative analysis 
to Attorney General William French Smith. They made clear not 
only their dismay with the ruling, but also their conclusion that 
Solicitor General Rex E. Lee's failure to have placed the Reagan 
5. TEX. Eouc. CODE § 21.031(1975). The law authorized local school districts to 
bar the admission of. or charge tuition to. alien children who were not "legally admitted" 
into the United States. Districts declining both options were to receive no state funds for 
the education of these children. 
6. Plvler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
7. /d: at 223. 230. The Supreme Court ruling in Plyler v. Doe decided two consoli· 
dated cases. one from for United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Doe v. 
Plvler. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980)) and the other from the United States District Court 
fo~ the Southern District of Texas (In re Alien Children Education Litigation. 501 F. 
Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980)). The District Court case was itself a consolidation. under the 
jurisdiction of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, of lawsuits that had been 
filed in three Federal districts in Texas. 
8. Plyler. 457 U.S. at 238 (Powell. J. concurring) 
9. /d. at 239 
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Administration's weight behind the state's defense of its law 
contributed significantly to the disappointing outcome. 10 
"[T]his is a case in which our supposed litigation program to 
encourage judicial restraint did not get off the ground, and 
should have," John G. Roberts Jr. and Carolyn B. Kuhl told the 
attorney general.'' The two added: "It seems likely that the dis-
senting Justices had particularly tried to win over Justice Powell, 
but were unable to do so .... It is our belief that a brief filed by 
the Solicitor General's Office supporting the State of Texas-
and the values of judicial restraint-could well have moved Jus-
tice Powell into the Chief Justice's camp and altered the out-
come of the case." 
The analysis was provocative, particularly in light of the 
subsequent career path of one of its authors. But it was almost 
certainly wrong. 
10. The brief the Solicitor General filed was an extremely odd. even tortured. 
document. Because the United States under the Carter Administration had been granted 
status as an intervening plaintiff in one of the cases. the brief identified the United States 
as a party in one case and an amicus curiae in the other. Despite the fact that both lower 
courts had found the Texas statute to violate equal protection. with the United States 
having joined the plaintiffs in making that argument. Solicitor General Lee told the Su-
preme Court that ''the interests of the United States in these cases are limited" and that 
the Government "does not address" the Equal Protection question except to agree with 
the lower courts that the plaintiffs were ··persons within the jurisdiction" within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brief for the United States at i. 5. 9. Plyler 
v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Nos. 80-1538 & 80-1934). Justice Brennan was to note in the 
majority opinion: "Our conclusion that the illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases 
may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection 
only begins the inquiry. The more difficult question is whether the Equal Protection 
Clause has been violated ...... Plyler. 457 U.S. at 215. Reviewing the brief for Justice 
Blackmun. the justice's law clerk wrote that the Government's explanation for its failure 
to adhere to its earlier position was "long and unconvincing ... Law Clerk's Bench Memo. 
Harry A. Blackmun Papers. Box 349. Folder 8 (on file with The Manuscript Division. 
Library of Congress). 
The U.S. brief was limited to a discussion of whether the Texas statute was pre-
empted by either of two federal laws. the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. (& 
Supp. III) 1101 et seq .. and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 20 
U.S.C. (Supp. III) 2701 et seq. The brief argued that neither statute was preemptive and 
that the Texas law did not violate the Supremacy Clause. The Solicitor General thus took 
no position on the bottom-line question of whether the lower courts should be affirmed 
or reversed. See Brief for United States. supra. 
Lawrence G. Wallace. the career Deputy Solicitor General who ordinarily handled 
the office's civil rights docket. conspicuously did not sign the brief. which bore only the 
names of Solicitor General Lee: William Bradford Reynolds. the Assistant Attorney 
General for civil rights: and Edwin S. Kneedler. an assistant to the Solicitor General. 
II. See David G. Savage & Maura Reynolds. More Earl1· Roberts Files Are Re-
leased: A Memo Shows that an '82 High Couri Ruling Was at 0£lds with his Views on Ju-
dicial Restraint as a Justice Dept. Lawyer. THE Los ANGELES TIMES. Aug. 12. 2005. at 
A14 (citing Memorandum from John G. Roberts Jr. and Carolyn B. Kuhl to Atty. Gen. 
William French (June 15. 1982) (on file with The National Archives)). 
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Justice Powell's papers, housed at his alma mater, Washing-
ton and Lee University Law School, show that while he found 
the case "extremely difficult" as a matter of legal doctrine, as he 
wrote to his law clerk while preparing for oral argument, 12 he 
sought from the very beginning of his consideration to find a way 
to safeguard the plaintiff children's interest in receiving an edu-
cation. It is extremely unlikely that a more strongly worded brief 
from the Solicitor General would have led him to abandon a 
deep conviction, based on his lifelong involvement in public edu-
cation, that the Texas law was detrimental not only to the chil-
dren at whom it was aimed, but to society at large. 
Still uncertain of how an opinion should be framed, Powell 
had concluded by the date of the argument, Dec. 1, 1981, that 
the statute must fall. He expressed that view at the justices' con-
ference three days after the case was argued. According to the 
hand-written outline of his views, which he drafted in prepara-
tion for the conference, Powell said that children "barred from 
all primary and secondary education" were a "helpless class," a 
'"discrete' minority without access to political process." As for 
how the opinion should be written, he said, "The standard of 
analysis should be one of heightened (but not strict) scrutiny."13 
Notes taken at the conference by both Justices Brennan and 
Blackmun confirm that Powell's participation followed his out-
line as he cast one of the five votes to affirm the judgment of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the 
statute was unconstitutional. The Mexican-born children on 
whose behalf the class-action lawsuit had been brought "have no 
responsibility for being there," Powell said, according to Bren-
nan's notes. It was "hard to think of [a] category more helpless 
than children of illegal aliens." Powell then stated, however, 
what was certainly obvious to his colleagues: that he did not view 
education as a "fundamental right," a position he had expressed 
for the Court eight years earlier in his majority opinion in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 14 But, he 
added, as long as the state chose to provide an education to 
12. Lewis F. Powell Jr., Annotation on Law Clerk's Bench Memo (Nov. 25. 1981). 
in Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers. Box 86 (on file with Washington and Lee University 
School of Law) [hereinafter LFP Papers]. 
13. Lewis F. Powell Jr., Plyler Sketch Outline 12/3 (Dec. 3. 1981). in LFP papers, 
supra note 12. 
14. San Antonio Indep. Sch. District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1983). 
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"some children," he did not see how it could deny the same 
benefit to others. 15 
Nonetheless, the two Justice Department lawyers were not 
completely off base in intuiting that Justice Powell had indeed 
been at the center of a struggle during the six and one-half 
months between the date the case was argued and the date it was 
decided. There were two senses in which this was true. There 
was the struggle by the Court's master tactician, William Bren-
nan, through successive opinion drafts, to craft an opinion that 
Powell could sign in full, as opposed to merely concurring in the 
result, an outcome that would have deprived the Court of a ma-
jority voice. And there was a second struggle, within the mind 
and heart of Lewis Powell himself. "I have agonized over this 
case more than a little," he would write to Brennan two months 
into the effort by the two men to find common ground, at a point 
when it was far from clear that the effort would succeed.16 
It did succeed, and a quarter-century later, the story of 
Plyler v. Doe is worth recapturing if only for the timeliness of its 
subject and the essential drama of how the opinion was pro-
duced through a polite but firm test of wills between two very 
different Justices who shared a common goal. The story allows 
us to pull back the curtain and observe the Supreme Court as we 
would hope it to be but fear that too often it is not, a place where 
Justices of decidedly different persuasions can work with mutual 
respect to find common ground in addressing some of the coun-
try's most intractable disputes. 
And it is worth reflecting, as well, on the particular role 
played by Lewis F. Powell Jr. He was the "swing Justice" of his 
time, before that mantle passed, following his retirement in 1987, 
to Justice O'Connor. Lewis Powell had never been a judge be-
fore his appointment to the Court in 1971 at the age of 64. A 
leader of many different institutions-a large corporate law firm, 
a school board, Colonial Williamsburg, the American Bar Asso-
ciation-he brought a pragmatic problem-solving focus to his 
new environment, responding instinctively rather than doctri-
15. William J. Brennan Jr.. Notes From Plyler v. Doe Judicial Conference (Dec. 4. 
1981). in William J. Brennan Papers. Part L Box 572. Folder 6 (on file with The Manu-
script Division. Library of Congress): See also, Harry A. Blackmun. Notes From Plyler v. 
Doe Judicial Conference (Dec. 4. 1981). in Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun. Box 
349. Folder 8 (on file with Manuscript Division. Library of Congress). 
16. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (Feb. 4. 1982). in Brennan Pa-
pers. supra note 15. See text at footnote 44. 
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nally to some of the hardest cases that reached the Court.17 In 
Plyler, he struggled to reconcile a profound sense of fairness 
with a tightly bound view of the judicial function. Born in 1907, a 
gentleman of the old South, Lewis Powell may appear to us now 
as someone from a long-ago era, a kind of judicial Everyman 
whose response to Plyler v. Doe can be seen as a mirror of how a 
basically conservative, fair minded citizen of his day, who hap-
pened to be a Supreme Court Justice, might have responded to 
the policy concerns that animated the case. 
Today's Supreme Court, of course, is very different, deeply 
polarized and lacking a single Justice who had not previously 
served as a judge on a federal court of appeals. Insistence on 
doctrinal purity seems to be the order of the day, as reflected in 
the inability of Chief Justice Roberts, for the plurality, and Jus-
tice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, to reach common 
ground in the 2006 Term's school integration case, Parents In-
volved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. l. 1s 
When a major immigration case next reaches the Court, as one 
will, we shall see whether the story of Plyler v. Doe is of more 
than merely historical interest. But it is surely at least that. 
II 
Justice Powell responded to the Texas statute not only as a 
Supreme Court Justice, but as one who had devoted years of his 
life to education, which he regarded as essential to the democ-
ratic enterprise. ''It is difficult to conceive of someone who could 
have had a more intimate knowledge of all facets of American 
education than the Honorable Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr.," in the 
words of one scholar of education law who deemed Powell "the 
education Justice" in a published appraisal in 2001.19 Powell's in-
terest in the subject was manifest throughout his judicial career; 
he wrote either for the Court or separately in 51 education-
related cases, including, most famously, his controlling separate 
opinion in Bakke, four years before Plyler. 20 A lifetime of ex-
perience told him that the Texas law was fundamentally miscon-
17. His dispositive votes in Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 
265. 269 (1978) and Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186. 197 (1986) can be seen as exam-
ples of this trait. 
18. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 
(2007). 
19. Victoria J. Dodd. The Education Justice: The Honorable Lewis Franklin Powell, 
Jr .. 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 683,687 (2001). 
20. Bakke. 438 U.S. at 269 (opinion of Powell. J.) 
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ceived: mean-spirited, hurtful to the individuals affected, and 
spectacularly counter-productive for society as a whole. The 
state's interest in educating the children, he noted in his pre-
conference outline, was "strong-perhaps stronger than those 
advanced for not educating. "21 And indeed, his opinion in Rodri-
guez had anticipated just such a situation, absent the immigra-
tion context. Rodriguez rejected the notion that disparities in 
wealth among a state's public school districts presented a prob-
lem of constitutional dimension. But if a state were actually to 
charge tuition to attend public school, meaning that those who 
were too poor to pay were "absolutely precluded from receiving 
an education," Powell had observed in a footnote, "that case 
would present a far more compelling set of circumstances for ju-
dicial assistance than the case before us today. "22 
Suggestive as it was, the Rodriguez footnote had not 
pointed the way to a resolution of the new case. It had simply 
opened the door a crack. The fact remained that even as Powell 
recoiled from the new Texas statute as a matter of policy, he also 
recoiled from the constitutional doctrines that came most readily 
to hand to strike it down: the jurisprudence of suspect categories 
and fundamental rights. As a Justice, Powell had been on the 
conservative side of a debate then raging in legal academia and 
the courts about whether the Constitution could properly be 
harnessed as an engine for social change. The Rodriguez case 
represented that debate in concrete form, and Powell's opinion 
for the Court made abundantly clear which side he was on. 
Another education case from Texas, Rodriguez presented 
an equal-protection challenge to the property-tax-based system 
for financing public education, a system that concededly created 
great disparities in the resources available to individual school 
districts, in Texas and nearly everywhere else."' The three-judge 
Federal District Court that declared this arrangement unconsti-
tutional had accepted the plaintiffs' threshold arguments: that 
poverty was a suspect category-so that public policies bearing 
on wealth were subject to strict judicial scrutiny-and that edu-
cation itself was a "fundamental'' right. access to which could be 
21. Powell. supra note 13. 
22. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1. 25 n.60 (1983). 
23. For a comprehensive account of the decision and the litigation that led to it. see 
PAUL A. SRACIC. SAN ANTONIO V. RODRIGUEZ AND THE PURSUIT OF EQUAL 
EDUCATION; THE DEBATE OVER DISCRIMINATION AND SCHOOL FUNDING (2006). 
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neither arbitrarily denied nor made available on an unequal ba-
sis unless justified by a compelling state interest.24 
Powell's rejection of the District Court's basic premises was 
blunt. "It is not the province of this Court to create substantive 
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protec-
tion of the laws," he wrote. 25 His opinion for the Court con-
cluded that the state's method for financing public education 
displayed no invidious discrimination and "abundantly satis-
fie[ d]" rational basis review, the minimal standard of scrutiny 
that he found appropriate to the plaintiffs' claim. 26 The problem 
presented by the case was a difficult one, Powell said, "[b ]ut the 
ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the 
democratic pressures of those who elect them."27 Fast forward 
eight years to the Justices' conference following the argument in 
Plyler v. Doe, and it is no wonder that Harry Blackmun, in his 
conference notes on what he referred to as the "alien children 
cases," placed an exclamation point after his notation of Powell's 
vote to affirm the lower courts' judgment that the Texas statute 
was unconstitutional. 28 
The significance of the Court's refusal to take the road open 
to it in Rodriguez was clear at the time, and became even more 
evident with the passing years. "Rodriguez was the death knell 
for the idea that the Constitution protects social and economic 
rights," Cass R. Sunstein wrote in his 2004 book on "FDR's un-
finished revolution."29 The prospect that the Court's increasingly 
embattled liberals could use Plyler v. Doe to blunt or undermine 
Rodriguez was vanishingly small, as small as the chance that 
Powell would repudiate in the new case anything he had said in 
the earlier one. In fact, Powell's Plyler file makes clear that Rod-
riguez was never far from his mind. "My concern when I wrote 
Rodriguez was not to create a chain reaction," he wrote in the 
draft of a letter to Brennan, which remained unsent. 30 Both 
Brennan and Powell, in their very different ways, would have to 
24. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971). 
25. San Anonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33. 
26. /d. at 55. 
27. /d. at 59. 
28. Blackmun, supra note 15 (In notes Blackmun made on the bench as the case 
was being argued, he predicted, with a question mark, that Powell would vote to reverse. 
He also predicted that O'Connor would go along with his own vote to affirm, a predic-
tion that also proved incorrect.) 
29. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FOR'S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 165 (2004). 
30. Draft of Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (Jan. 26, 1982), in LFP 
Papers, supra note 12 ("Dear Bill" document marked "Draft- not sent"). 
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deal with both cases and, while remaining true to their own prin-
ciples, reconcile them in the course of reaching a result that both 
sought. 
Brennan, who as the senior Justice in the majority had as-
signed the case to himself, could not resist making an initial ef-
fort it to use the opinion to recapture lost ground from Rodri-
guez. To that extent, the decisional process in Plyler represented 
an effort to pick up the Rodriquez debate where it had left off in 
March 1973. Brennan drafted a 41-page opinion that described 
the children on whose behalf the class-action lawsuits had been 
brought as "a discrete and historically demeaned group" who, 
victimized by the state in an act of facial discrimination "solely 
on the basis of personal status," were being deprived of a "pri-
mary tool of equality," namely education. Strict scrutiny must 
apply, Brennan wrote, and because the state's justifications in 
support of the law "do not approach the showing of compelling 
need required," the judgments of the Court of Appeals must be 
affirmed. 31 
Brennan knew, of course, that he could not hope to hold 
Powell's vote with such an analysis unless he persuasively distin-
guished Powell's opinion for the Court in Rodriguez. The effort 
was rather transparently half-hearted. "This case lies far on the 
other end of the equal protection spectrum from Rodriguez," he 
wrote. "We are not presented here with a complex scheme of fi-
nance and funding indirectly resulting in comparative disadvan-
tages for a fluid group, definable for purposes of equal protec-
tion analysis only by presence within a less favored geographic 
area." By contrast, the Texas law was a species of the "class or 
caste" legislation "with which the Equal Protection Clause is 
most directly concerned. "32 
On Jan. 25, 1982, Brennan took what he called "the unusual 
step" of circulating this draft not to the entire Conference (the 
Court's internal term of reference for the nine Justices collec-
tively) but only to the members of his putative majority: Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Powell. In letters to each of 
the four, he introduced the draft: "My conference notes show no 
clear consensus with respect to the level of scrutiny to be af-
forded the Texas statute. But my impression was that those who 
voted with me to affirm shared my particular concern with a 
31. William J. Brennan, Draft for Circulation 36,41 (Jan. 25, 1982), in Brennan Pa-
pers. supra note 15. 
32. /d. at 35-36. 
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statute, such as this, that sought to deprive innocent children not 
remotely responsible for their plight of their right to an educa-
tion. "33 
There was, of course, no "right to an education" under the 
Court's case law. Brennan passed over this obstacle and pressed 
on. "The opinion is less broad than it might be," he said, "if it 
concerned itself only with the 'fundamentality' of education, or 
the 'class' of innocent children. However, since a strong case for 
heightened scrutiny could be made simply on the basis of the 
class discriminated against, I thought it appropriate, indeed nec-
essary, where denial of basic education was at stake, to hold 
strict scrutiny standards applicable. " 34 
No doubt recognizing that he had pushed his argument to 
the limit, Brennan returned to an emphasis on the qualifications 
that he said were inherent in his analysis. The draft had de-
scribed the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment as particu-
larly concerned with access to education as an aspect of making 
concrete the promise of equal protection. Referring to this as-
pect of the draft, Brennan said in his letter that "[f]inally, it 
seems to me that the historical approach of this draft, although 
leading to strict scrutiny here, is for that very reason largely self-
limiting and unlikely to force us down any uncharted paths in the 
future." He even preemptively offered to cut from the draft the 
11 pages of strict-scrutiny analysis, because "[i]n my view, the 
Texas statute would fail under even an intermediate standard of 
review ... with the same ultimate result.""'' 
Powell was not ready to buy what Brennan was trying to 
sell. On Jan. 30, he replied to Brennan by a three-page letter that 
he also sent to Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. The draft was 
·'an impressive piece of work, and I have enjoyed reading it,'' he 
said. But he said that it "sweeps rather broadly, and leaves me a 
little uneasy as to inferences that may be drawn from it in other 
connections not clearly foreseeable. "36 
The source of Powell's unease was, in fact, the heart of 
Brennan's analysis. He could not agree, he said, that either ille-
gal aliens in general or their children in particular were a "sus-
pect class," deserving of strict scrutiny. "We have never held that 
33. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Blackmun (Jan. 25. 1982). in Blackmun 
Papers. supra note 15. at Folder 6. 
34. /d. 
35. /d. 
36. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (Jan. 30. 1982). in Blackmun Pa-
pers. supra note 15. at Folder 6. 
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persons unlawfully in this country, whatever their age, are a sus-
pect class in the full meaning of the term," he said. And while "I 
fully share your view as to the importance of education, particu-
larly in a democracy," he could not subscribe to Brennan's im-
plication that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had 
been concerned with "creating an expectation of public educa-
tion." Powell continued: "As I am not sure where this would 
lead us, I need to examine your language in this respect more 
carefully. I have not viewed the Amendment as the source of any 
right to education." Citing Rodriguez, Powell said: "It was my 
view then and now that there is no constitutional right to a state 
provided education any more than there is such a constitutional 
right to welfare, housing, health services, public works and pub-
lic utilities-all of which are considered by most of us to be es-
sential. "37 
Brennan had clearly overreached. But just as clearly, all was 
not lost-far from it. Powell said he would subject the Texas 
statute to mid-level scrutiny, that is, to a requirement that the 
state justify its law by showing a "substantial" state interest. a 
considerably more stringent test than the "mere rationality" re-
quired by the lowest tier of equal protection scrutiny. "As the 
class is composed of innocent children, uniquely postured, I 
would agree that a 'heightened' level of scrutiny is required," 
Powell said. And, he added, "As Texas has advanced no interest 
that I consider sufficiently substantial to justify the discrimina-
tion, I agree that there has been a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause."'" 
Any heightened judicial scrutiny, whether mid-level or 
strict, has the effect of shifting to the government the burden of 
justifying the challenged differential treatment. The distance 
from rational-basis review to either form of heightened scrutiny, 
in other words, is much further than the interval between mid-
level and strict scrutiny. Powell had given Brennan a great deal 
to work with. But at the same time, in his gentle way, he made it 
clear that the Rodriquez debate, as far as he was concerned, was 
settled. He ended his letter with an obliquely worded but unmis-
takable challenge: "I will join your judgment, and hope that in 
the drafting and redrafting process the opinion can be focused so 
specifically on this uniquely discrete class that I can join your 
37. !d. 
38. !d. 
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opinion also. "39 The meaning was not lost on Brennan. Two days 
later, Blackmun's law clerk, Charles A. Rothfeld, wrote to his 
justice: "As I understand it, WJB is Zoing to make substantial 
changes to accommodate LP's views." 
On Feb. 2, Brennan sent Powell and the others in the major-
ity a three-page letter infused with hope and diplomacy. "I'm 
very encouraged that it will not be difficult to find common 
ground because I tend to perceive this case, and what would be 
the most appropriate opinion for the Court, in very nearly the 
terms that you do," Brennan wrote. Noting that his initial draft 
had been "purposefully 'firmed up' with as much support as pos-
sible, in order to bring to the fore all the problems at work in this 
somewhat sui generis case," he indicated that he was now ready 
to tone the opinion back down.41 
He was not, however, ready to give up. He agreed with 
Powell that "there is just no support" in either the Congressional 
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Court's cases, 
"for the idea that a state has any affirmative obligation to estab-
lish a system of public education." Indeed, he had not meant to 
suggest otherwise. Nonetheless, he continued, both the debates 
and the cases did support the view "that education is of special 
importance within the framework of equality." Thus, when it 
came to the alien children, "(a]lthough concededly the argument 
for 'middle-level' scrutiny, across-the-board for such children is 
strong," Brennan said he believed the better course would be to 
avoid a blanket label and instead emphasize the nature of the 
"uniquely discrete class being discriminated against here." Bren-
nan added: "I do think that the discrete nature of the class 
heightens for them the significance of education." He then of-
fered to relegate the bulk of his equal protection analysis to a 
footnote and invited Powell's further comments and sugges-
tions.42 
These were major concessions. Indeed, Powell's law clerk 
told him "if anything, Justice Brennan may be inviting some 
problems from Justice Marshall and Blackmun" by down-
playing so much of his original equal protection analysis.43 But 
39. ld. 
40. Memorandum from Charles A. Rothfield, Clerk to Justice Blackmun, to Justice 
Blackmun (Feb. 1, 1982), in Blackmun Papers, supra note 15. 
41. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell, (Feb. 2, 1982), in Blackmun Pa-
pers. supra note 15, at Folder 6. 
42. ld. 
43. Memorandum from David Levi to Justice Powell (Feb. 2, 1982) in LFP papers, 
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Powell remained wary, understanding as he did that Brennan 
was still trying to preserve a strict-scrutiny analysis, albeit one 
limited to the educational context of the case. Perhaps he sus-
pected that Brennan was seeding the opinion with notions of 
equal protection that could be tended and made to flower later 
in places as yet unforeseen. He replied to Brennan on Feb. 4. "I 
have agonized over this case more than a little, as the answer 
seems so clear to me and yet writing it out creates various con-
cerns," he wrote. While Brennan had offered a "substantial clari-
fication," Powell said, "I have concluded that it is best for me to 
write separately. My concern as to the 'open endedness' of equal 
protection prompts me to be extremely cautious in this case as to 
the reach of the precedent we set ... This case is quite unique, 
and I have thought it prudent to write less exhaustively than 
your opinion. I recognize, of course, that your purpose also has 
been to circumscribe our holding narrowly, and perhaps you 
have done this. Nevertheless, given my concerns, I am presently 
inclined to join only the judgment. ''44 
Brennan made a further try, offering on Feb. 8 some slight 
revisions as part of a proposed opinion that, for the first time, he 
circulated to the Conference. His changes, he told Powell, "ef-
fectively preserve, and support, your Rodriguez views."45 
Unpersuaded, Powell the next day circulated to the Confer-
ence his proposed partial concurrence and concurrence in the 
judgment. The seven-page document had the form of an equal 
protection opinion, but little of the analytical content that one 
would expect under that label. Instead, his focus was, at it had 
been from the beginning, on the unique plight of children "who 
are the victims of a combination of circumstances": their "inno-
cence" of the acts of parents who remained illegally in Texas af-
ter crossing an open border, which Powell described almost as an 
attractive nuisance; the failure by Congress to provide "effective 
leadership" on "a problem of serious national proportions"; the 
likelihood that a substantial number of the affected children 
would remain in the United States for the rest of their lives as a 
"subclass of illiterate persons." Powell continued: "In my view, 
supra note 12. 
44. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (Feb. 4. 1982), in Brennan Pa-
pers. Papers. supra note 15. 
45. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell (Feb. 8, 1982), in Brennan Pa-
pers. Papers, supra note 15. 
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the state's denial of education to these children bears no sub-
stantial relation to any substantial state interest." 46 
His concern for children permeated the opinion. He quoted 
from a 1953 concurring opinion by Justice Frankfurter: "Chil-
dren have a very special place in life which law should reflect." 47 
And he cited two decisions on the rights of illegitimate children 
that he had written for the Court.48 
Powell saved his doctrinal disagreement with Brennan's cir-
culating draft for a long footnote."Although I believe that our 
review here should be somewhat more searching than in the 
normal equal protection case, I do not join in the Court's conclu-
sion that strict scrutiny is appropriately applied to this classifica-
tion," he wrote. "This exacting standard of review has been re-
served for instances in which a 'fundamental' constitutional right 
or a 'suspect' classification is present. Neither is clearly present 
in this case, as the Court recognizes." He added that the draft's 
insistence on strict scrutiny despite this ostensible recognition 
was not "consistent with our approach in other equal protection 
cases and it may tend to undermine the constructive discipline 
that the 'suspect classification' and 'fundamental right' concepts 
have imposed upon this area of the law."49 
Two months after argument, the effort to craft an opinion 
for the Court appeared to have foundered. At this point, two 
other members of the majority weighed in with letters to Justice 
Brennan. Both Blackmun and Stevens urged him to move fur-
ther in Powell's direction. The "class" of "illegal aliens" was a 
"poorly defined" one, Blackmun wrote, noting that one of the 
lower courts had found that a substantial number of the children 
were likely to remain in the United States and were not pres-
ently deportable; in any event, it was impossible to know which 
of the children might be found deportable or eventually be de-
ported.~~ 
Blackmun continued: "Thus, every child has a 'right' to be 
here until he actually is placed under a deportation order, and at 
46. Lewis F. Powell Jr., Plyler v. Doe Opinion Draft (Feb. 9, 1982). in Blackmun 
Papers. supra note 15. at Folder 7. 
47. /d. at 4 (citing May v. Anderson. 345 U.S. 528. 536 (1953) (Frankfurter. J. con-
curring)). 
48. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co .. 406 U.S. 164 (1972) and Trimble v. 
Gordon. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
49. Powell. supra note 46, at 4 n.2. 
50. Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan (Mar. 10. 1982), in Blackmun 
Papers. supra note 15. at Folder 6. 
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every step of the immigration process a federal official still has 
the discretion to allow the child to remain in the United States. 
Many of these children, therefore, have, or will have, political 
and related rights, and there is no way for the State to determine 
which children do not have such rights." There was consequently 
no need to refer to the children as members of a suspect class, 
Blackmun said; rather, "one could say that the reason education 
is fundamental is that it is preservative of other rights" and 
"[t]he reason that it is fundamental to this group is that some of 
these children will be here permanently.''" 
It was, perhaps, a way out of the box, a way to get out of the 
suspect-category cui de sac without yielding much ground as a 
practical matter. In any event, Blackmun told Brennan, "I think 
it is desira~le, if at all ,possible, to have a Court opinion, as well 
as a Court JUdgment."· Stevens agreed. He told Brennan that "I 
am reasonably sure that any draft that is acceptable to you and 
to Lewis will be one that I will be able to join." Stevens added 
that "I agree completely with Harry's suggestion that it is ex-
tremely important to obtain a Court opinion if that is at all pos-
sible." He also said he agreed with Blackmun that "the reference 
to illegal aliens as a suspect class could well be deleted from the 
opinion." Perhaps, he said, the opinion could simply declare that 
what Texas was doing was irrational." 
But Blackmun's effort to reframe the question by centering 
an opinion around the "fundamental" nature of education, 
rather than on the nature of the excluded class, did not reassure 
Powell. "As important as education has been in the life of my 
family for three generations," he wrote to Blackmun, "I would 
hesitate before creating another heretofore unidentified right." 
Maybe it would be just as well not to have an opinion for the 
Court in "this unique case," he continued. 'This will leave the 
Court free to meet unforeseeable situations without being bound 
by a decision tailored to redress a peculiar and unprecedented 
type of injustice." In other words, perhaps it would be better for 
all concerned simply to give up the effort.54 
But that was not Brennan's way. On April 5, he circulated a 
new draft, one he described to Powell as "much revised." In-
SL ld. 
52. Id. 
53. Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan (Mar. 10. 1982). in Blackmun 
Papers. supra note 15. at Folder 6. 
54. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Blackmun (Mar. 12. 1982) in LFP Papers. 
supra note 12. 
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deed, it was. "We reject the claim that 'illegal aliens' are a 'sus-
pect class,' " the draft said in one of the footnotes to which much 
of the formal equal protection analysis was now relegated.55 The 
body of the opinion now simply emphasized the plaintiffs' 
uniquely blameless and helpless situation. Brennan cited Trimble 
v. Gordon, one of Powell's earlier opinions for the Court on the 
rights of illegitimate children: "Their 'parents have the ability to 
conform their conduct to societal norms,' and presumably the 
wherewithal to remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; 
but the children who are plaintiffs in these cases 'can affect nei-
ther their parents' conduct nor their own status."'"" 
Powell grasped the implications immediately. "WJB, in this 
draft, has adopted the substance of my views ... I believe I can 
join," he wrote on his copy of Brennan's draft.57 To Brennan, he 
wrote: "This is a fine draft, and I am grateful to you for making 
this substantial effort to accommodate my thinking about this 
case-in the commendable interest of mustering a Court." He 
had only a few changes to offer, he said, and with those, he 
would join the opinion. "I may retain some portions of my brief 
concurring opinion that will reinforce rather than detract in any 
way from what you have written so well," he added. 58 
His few objections to Brennan's draft were telling. Brennan 
had written that the creation of a permanent underclass of un-
documented residents "presents most difficult problems for a 
Nation that prides itself on egalitarian principles." On his copy 
of Brennan's draft, at page 16, Powell wrote: "Egalitarian is a 
code word." He asked Brennan to delete it and to substitute 
"principles of equality under law." 59 Brennan complied 
promptly, circulating a revised draft the next day. On the follow-
ing day, AprilS, Powell circulated his formal "join." 
The following day, Powell received an angry personal letter 
from the Chief Justice. "Dear Lewis," Warren Burger wrote. "I 
am profoundly troubled by the developments in this case and of 
55. Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell (Apr. 5. 1982). in Brennan Pa-
pers. supra note 15: Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (Apr. 7. 1982). in 
Brennan Papers. supra note 15 (with Justice Brennan's Apr. 5 draft attached). 
56. William J. Brennan, Jr .. Plyler v. Doe Opinion Draft (Apr. 5. 1982) in Brennan 
Papers. supra note 15 (attached to Powell's letter of April 7) (citing Trimble v. Gordon. 
430 U.S. 762,770 (1977)). 
57. Lewis F. Powell Jr., Notation on Brennan Draft of April 5 (April 6. 1982). in 
LFP Papers, supra note 12. 
58. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (Apr. 6. 1982) in Brennan Papers. 
supra note 15: LFP Papers, supra note 12. 
59. Powell. Notation on Brennan Draft. supra note 57. 
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course will not join it as it stands. What limiting principle can 
confine this massive expansion of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ... " Burger's threat to withhold his vote was a peculiarly 
hollow one, as he had been in dissent from the beginning. In any 
event, there is no evidence that Powell bothered to reply.60 
With concurring and dissenting opinions still in circulation, 
it took six weeks before the decision was ready for announce-
ment. (Blackmun and Marshall, in addition to Powell, filed con-
curring opinions, while Burger wrote the dissent, noting that 
"The Constitution does not provide a cure for every social ill, 
nor does it vest 1udges with a mandate to try to remedy every so-
cial problem.")6 Brennan labored over his "hand-down," as the 
Justices refer among themselves to the oral announcement of an 
opinion; the seven-page draft in his file contains a number of 
emendations and hand-written additions. "As respects the stan-
dard of scrutiny appropriate for the evaluation of the Texas stat-
ute," Brennan announced to the courtroom audience on the 
morning of June 15, 1982, "we conclude that the discrimination 
contained in the statute against these children can hardly be con-
sidered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the 
state. "62 
His description of the holding went on: "Public Education is 
not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Constitution." (Bren-
nan's printed script here contained a citation to Rodriguez.) 
"But neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indistin-
guishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the 
importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, 
and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, 
mark the distinction .... In addition, education provides the ba-
sic tools by which individuals might lead economically produc-
tive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a funda-
mental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot 
ignore the significant social costs borne by our nation when 
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and 
skills upon which our social order rests. "63 
Brennan concluded: "If the state is to deny a discrete group 
of innocent children the free public education that it offers to 
60. Letter from Justice Burger to Justice Powell (April 9. 1982) in LFP Papers 
supra note 12. 
61. Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202. 253 (1982) (Burger. C.J.. dissenting). 
62. William J. Brennan. Jr.. Bench Announcement 4 (June 15. 1982). in Brennan 
Papers. supra note 15. at Folder 7. 
63. /d. at 4-5. 
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other children residing within its border, that denial must be jus-
tified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state inter-
est. No such showing was made here."64 
The following day, William Brennan received from Lewis 
Powell a handwritten letter. "Dear Bill," it began. 
"You are to be congratulated on Plyler-especially on the 
painstaking and generous way you wrote an opinion that ac-
commodated our several differing views, and finally obtained a 
Court. 
"Your final product is excellent and will be in every text and 
case book on Constitutional law. 
"I also was proud of your verbal summary from the Bench 
Tuesday a.m. 
"As ever, Lewis.""' 
III 
The primary winners of Plyler v. Doe were, of course, the 
children on whose behalf the case was brought- and not only 
the children of Texas.66 Eight years later, the voters of California, 
in another of the anti-immigrant spasms that periodically afflict 
this nation of immigrants, adopted Proposition 187. Among the 
burdens that measure placed on undocumented immigrants was 
the denial of a public education. Promptly enjoining enforce-
ment, the Federal District Court found that the existence of 
clear federal law to the contrary made it obvious that the initia-
tive's education restriction was preempted. ("[the] denial of pri-
mary and secondary education conflicts with federal law as an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe and is therefore 
preempted. "t 
To that extent, William Brennan was also the winner, for 
having produced a majority opinion with an indisputably clear 
holding. 
64. !d. at 7. 
65. Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (June 16. 1982). in Brennan Pa-
pers. supra note 15. at Folder 7. 
06. Marv Ann Zehr. Amid Immigration Debate, Settled Ground. EDUCATION 
WEEK, June 6. 2007. at I (commenting on the impact of the decision 25 years later in 
Tvler. Tex .. where the case began). 
· 67. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson. 908 F. Supp. 755. 787 (C.D. 
Calif. 1995) (opinion of Pfaelzer. J.). 
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But if Plyler v. Doe was one battle in a war over constitu-
tional interpretation, it is clear after the passage of 27 years that 
Lewis Powell, and not William Brennan, won that war. Powell 
wanted the case to be about the education of children, not the 
equal protection rights of immigrants, and so the decision was. In 
stressing the unique aspects of the children's plight and of the 
disability that Texas sought to impose on them, Powell extracted 
an opinion that, if not unique, has had little generative force. 
Rather than opening a new constitutional conversation, Plyler 
served as a measure of how far the Burger Court had moved in 
the years since an idealistic group of lawyers, during the waning 
years of the Warren Court era, launched the litigation that had 
ended in failure in Rodriquez and into which William Brennan, 
for all his powers of persuasion, could breathe no new life."" 
Plyler's significance for the new generation of anti-
immigrant ordinances is cloudy at best, as illustrated by one rep-
resentative recent case that attained a high profile because it was 
one of the first to be filed in Federal District Court. In 2006, the 
city of Hazelton, Pa. adopted ordinances to prohibit the em-
ployment and "harboring" of undocumented aliens, as well as to 
prevent them from renting apartments. On July 26, 2007, Judge 
James M. Munley of Federal District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania declared the ordinances unconstitutional. 
'The genius of our Constitution is that it provides rights even to 
those who evoke the least sympathy from the general public," 
Judge Munley wrote. "In that way, all in this nation can be con-
fident of equal justice under its laws."69 But significantly, Judge 
Munley rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection claim and ruled 
primarily on the basis of federal preemption (explicit preemp-
tion as well as field and conflict preemption) of immigration pol-
icy.70 And while a judge in Fairfax County, Va. recently cited 
Plyler's equal protection holding in an opinion striking down a 
local ordinance aimed at forbidding day laborers, nearly all of 
whom are undocumented immigrants, from using any "highway, 
sidewalk, driveway, parking area, or alley" as a place for seeking 
employment from passing pedestrians or motorists, the opinion 
relied on the First Amendment; the Plyler citation was dicta.71 
68. For a history of the Rodriguez case. see SRACIC. supra note 23. 
69. Lozano v. City of Hazleton. 496 F. Supp. 2d 477. 555 (2007). See also Julia Pre-
ston. Judge Voids Ordinances on 11/egal/mmigranrs. N.Y. TIMES, July 27. 2007. at A14. 
70. Lozano. 496 F. Supp. at 555. 
71. The Fairfax County Circuit Court found that in the absence of adequate "'alter-
native channels of communication." the anti-solicitation ordinance violated the job-
seekers' right to free speech. Town of Herndon v. Thomas. No. MI-2007-644. slip op. at 7 
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The state's defense of its statute in Plyler offered many of 
the same arguments that are being raised today by those who 
would deny to undocumented immigrants such necessities as 
housing,72 employment/3 and-an increasingly popular way for 
politicians to demonstrate their disapproval of illegal immigra-
tion-in-state tuition rates at public colleges and universities.74 
(A group of Republicans in the Virginia Legislature recently an-
nounced their intention to introduce a bill to bar undocumented 
students from public universities entirely, regardless of the stu-
dents' ability or willingness to pay.f' 
Elected officials have learned that they show support for 
undocumented residents at their peril, as Gov. Eliot Spitzer of 
New York found out when he was forced to withdraw his pro-
posal to give drivers' licenses to illegal immigrants. 76 Local ordi-
nances and policies around the country are transforming police 
and other officials into immigration law enforcers.77 A sting op-
(Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29. 2007) (citing Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202.211-12 (1982)). 
72. Patrick McGee, Rental Ban Faces Court Challenges, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, May 16, 2007. at B5 (describing litigation over a ban on renting apartments 
to undocumented immigrants adopted by the voters of Farmers Branch. Tex. in a May 
2007 referendum). 
73. E.g. Randal C. Archibold. Arizona Governor Signs Tough Bill on Hiring Illegal 
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 3. 2007, A10 (describing a state law under which employers 
who fail to verify the legal status of their employees risk suspension or. for a second of-
fense. permanent revocation of their state business license). The Federal District Court 
in Arizona rejected a preemption-based challenge to the statute in Arizona Contractors 
Association Inc. v. Candelaria. See supra note 3. 
74. E.g. Joseph Berger. Debates Persist Over Subsidies for lmmigranr College Stu-
dents. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at B8; Josh Keller. State Legislatures Debate Tuition for 
Illegal Immigrants. THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Aprill3. 2007. at 28; Sta-
cey Stowe. Rei/ Vetoes Local Benefit for Students Here Illegally. N.Y. TIMES. June 27. 
2007. at B5 (describing Connecticut governor's veto of a bill that would have provided in-
state tuition rates at state colleges and universities, regardless of a student's immigration 
status, as long as the student lived in the state and had graduated from a Connecticut 
high school. Gov. Rell said she understood the impulse behind the Legislature's passage 
of the measure but "(t]he fact remains, however, that these students and their parents are 
here illegally. and neither sympathy nor good intentions can ameliorate that fact.") Only 
10 states currently permit undocumented graduates of public high schools to attend pub-
lic universities at in-state tuition rates. One, ironically. is Texas, along with California. 
Illinois, Kansas. Nebraska, New Mexico. New York. Oklahoma, Utah and Washington. 
Kathy Kiely, Children Caught in the Immigration Crossfire. USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 2007. at 
Al. 
75. Tim Craig. Va. Republican Bill Would Bar Illegal Immigrants From College. 
THEW ASHINGTON POST. Aug. 30,2007, at Al. 
76. Nick Paumgarten. The Humbling of Eliot Spitzer. THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 10. 
2007. at 72. 72-85; Lisa Rein, Immigrant Driver ID Rejected by O'Malley. THE 
WASHINGTON POST. Jan. 16, 2008, at B1 (reporting on decision by Gov. Martin O'Malley 
of Maryland). 
77. Daryl Fears, Illegal Immigranrs Targeted by States. THE WASHINGTON POST. 
June 25. 2007. at Al; Jill P. Capuzzo, Connecticut City Plans to Team Its Police With Fed-
era/Immigration Agents. N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 6. 2008. at Bl: Randal C. Archibold. Phoenix 
2008] WHAT WOULD JUSTICE POWELL DO? 49 
eration in Danbury, Connecticut, in which police posed as con-
tractors seeking to hire day laborers and then turned the job-
seekers over to immigration officials for deportation, is the sub-
ject of a pending federallawsuit. 78 
A Federal District Judge, A. Richard Caputo, granted a pre-
liminary injunction last year in favor of a couple who had been 
refused a marriage license by the Register of Wills in Luzerne 
County, Pa. because the groom, a Mexican national, could pro-
duce neither a visa nor a green card to show that he was in the 
country legally. Citing Plyler v. Doe for the proposition that 
"aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, 
have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process 
of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments," Judge Caputo 
held that the "fundamental character of the right to marry" ap-
plied to alien and citizen alike.79 
It was a rare citation of Plyler, a rarity that in fact under-
scores the uncertainty of how the current Court would resolve 
any of the current disputes. A cynical appraisal of the Court's 
performance in Plyler, and specifically of Powell's role, comes 
from Mark Tushnet, who observed in 1995 that while the deci-
sion "on one level had almost no generative or doctrinal signifi-
cance," on the other hand it had "profound doctrinal significance 
because one could interpret it to hold that the Supreme Court 
will strike down statutes that are unconstitutional when a major-
ity of the Court thinks those statutes are unwise social policy." 
Tushnet continued: "Powell's jurisprudence produced an opin-
ion that was almost nothing more than a direct reflection of his 
views of social policy. The Framers designed the Constitution, it 
appears, to allow judges to strike down statutes that are, to a 
person as reasonable as Powell, not sensible. ,&J 
Perhaps. Yet to answer the question framed by this lecture, 
"What would Justice Powell do?" by asserting that he would do 
what he thought was reasonable is to beg the question rather 
than answer it. Although after leaving the bench, Powell ex-
pressed regret over his vote with the majority to reject the gay 
rights claim in Bowers v. Hardwick, s'and general doubt about the 
Police to Check Arrestees' Immigrant Status. N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 16.2008. at A10. 
78. Nina Bernstein. Challenge in Connecticut Over Immigrants' Arrest. N.Y. TIMES. 
Sept. 26. 2007. at Bl. 
79. Buck v. Stankovic. 485 F. Supp.2d 576. 582 (2007). 
80. Mark Tushnet. Lives in the Law: Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence 
of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1854 (1995). 
81. Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See Linda Greenhouse. When Second 
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wisdom of the Court's course on capital punishment, in which he 
had been an active participant,82 he never gave voice, at least 
publicly, to any second thoughts about either Rodriguez or 
Plyler. The chances are not great that he would have found a 
constitutional basis for disapproval of the burdens being placed 
on undocumented immigrants today-or even, necessarily, that 
he would have disapproved them as a matter of policy. Looking 
at Lewis Powell as our hypothetical Everyman at the center of 
his Court, it is therefore most unlikely that today's Court would 
disapprove them either. 
But it is safe to assume that Justice Powell's judgment on 
these issues, whatever it might have been, would not have been a 
snap one. Perhaps he would have "agonized" over the next case 
as he did over Plyler. Perhaps not. But he would have listened 
respectfully to all arguments and weighed them carefully. The 
likelihood is remote that he would have bemoaned, as did a 
young Justice Department lawyer 27 years ago, the failure of any 
particular case to fit into a "litigation program to encourage ju-
dicial restraint."83 He would, in other words, have confronted his 
own preconceptions and wrestled with them, rather than try to 
enshrine them into law. 
After Justice Powell's death in 1998 at the age of 90, his 
former law clerk and protege, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 
published a reminiscence in which he posed the question that he 
said was suggested by Lewis Powell's life: "How then does one 
both perfectly reflect background and powerfully transcend it?"84 
We can ask no more of a judge. 
Thoughts in Case Come Too Late. N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 5. 1990. at A14. 
82. E. R. Shipp, Ex-Justice Suggests Legislators Reconsider Capital Punishment. 
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